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COMPETITIVE ISSUES RAISED BY
THE PROSPECT OF PRACTICING
GLOBALLY WHILE REGULATING
LOCALLY
DANIEL J. GILMAN, PH.D., J.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The framing issue for the roundtable and these accompanying papers -
legal impediments to telemedicine - is, at its core, an issue for competition
policy, and this paper seeks to shed some light on what that entails.1
Physician licensure, like professional licensure generally, is a barrier to
entry. Restricting entry is what licensure is for.2 Not all barriers to entry are
Copyright C Daniel J. Gilman 2011.
* Daniel J. Gilman is an Attorney-Advisor in the Office of Policy Planning at the Federal Trade
Commission. This essay is based on remarks offered at the Legal Obstacles to Telemedicine
Roundtable at the University of Maryland School of Law, April 16, 2010. The views expressed
herein, like those at the roundtable, are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Federal Trade Commission, any of its individual Commissioners, or the Office of
Policy Planning at the FTC. The author thanks roundtable participants for their discussion of these
issues and James Cooper, Suzanne Drennon Munck, and Gustav Chiarello for their comments on
an early draft of this paper. Any faults that remain are the responsibility of the author alone.
1. General questions about the implications of licensing for telemedicine, as seen from a
competition standpoint, are not new. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION, exec. summary at 14, 22-23, ch. 2 at 25,
30-33 (2004) [hereinafter A DOSE OF COMPETITION], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf (examining the relationship among
physician licensure, consumer benefits, and marketplace competition). These remarks are intended
to revisit and update that discussion, in part because the competition perspective has been lacking
in so many recent discussions of telemedicine and HIT policy.
2. Licensure is a process that guards entry into an occupation, and requires the license seeker
to obtain the permission of a government agency before providing professional services in that
agency's jurisdiction. Typically, the state licensing authority requires the license-seeker to
demonstrate a minimum degree of competence in turn. FED. TRADE COMM'N, JOINT
FTC/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HEARING ON HEALTH CARE AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
87
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
substantial or durable, much less undue or unlawful, and it does not follow
from the very nature of physician licensure that licensure is anticompetitive,
fails to provide consumer benefits, or is not, on balance, cost-justified.3 On
the other hand, any particular licensing scheme may evidence one or all of
those failings. 4 It is not impertinent to ask when that is, or might be, the
case. To do so is to look at physician licensure from the perspective of
competition law and policy. It is the purpose of this paper to do just that.
In particular, this discussion will focus on the costs that state-based
physician licensure may impose on a particular area of innovation in health
care delivery - that is, the development and adoption of telemedicine. 5 In
doing so, this brief paper will not attempt a comprehensive account of all
the costs and benefits of state-based licensure. Neither will this paper
attempt to argue that the conduct of one or more state boards of medicine
violates the antitrust laws. Rather, this paper will identify certain
competitive problems posed by the current system of state-based physician
licensing, especially as these problems may be costly for the development
of telemedicine technology and the practice of telemedicine.6 Note at the
outset that the framing issue of the roundtable - legal impediments to
telemedicine - dovetails with a sort of competitive inquiry: certain
impediments to competition (barriers to entry in particular) are identified; if
the impediments are not trivial, we move to the question whether they are
justified by countervailing consumer protection benefits or other pro-
consumer efficiencies. An adequate exploration of these questions may, in
turn, require detailed fact-specific inquiries and systematic empirical
analyses - evidence-based medical policy to frame evidence-based
medicine - some of which are available and some of which are not.
33-34 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/healthcarehearings/030610ftctrans.pdf
(statement of Dr. Morris Kleiner). See also A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 25
("Through licensure requirements, states may restrict market entry by physicians and allied health
professionals (AHPs), and further limit the scope of authorized practice.").
3. "Licensing may improve the average quality of service offered by practitioners when the
entry of less competent practitioners is prevented or when less competent practitioners are forced
to increase their investments in human capital." Adriana D. Kugler & Robert M. Sauer, Doctors
Without Borders? Relicensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for Physicians,
23 J. LAB. ECON. 437, 438 (2005). See also Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition
and Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J.L. & ECON. 165, 185-86 (1978) (examining
approaches to physician licensure and finding "no clear answer" to question of who benefits from
the medical profession's licensing requirements).
4. See, e.g., Charles H. Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer's
Case for Abolition, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 341-42 (1983) (detailing how licensure has failed to
produce lasting net benefits in quality and has led to increased health care costs).
5. See infra Part Ill.
6. See infra Part Ill.
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The heart of the policy problem is this: telemedicine 7 promises in
various ways to reduce the costs and extend the reach of many health care
services,8 but the advantages of remote and networked expertise may be
poorly accommodated by licensing schemes that were developed to regulate
local medical practices - practices historically dominated by face-to-face
encounters between a physician and her patient.9 Telemedicine has the
potential to improve access to health care and lower its costs via the use of
increasingly efficient and rich tools for gathering, processing, and
disseminating health information.10 At the most basic level, medical
problems and the expertise pertinent to their solutions need not always be in
the same room at the same time, and the fragmentation of health care can be
reduced, rather than exacerbated, by remote communications." However,
state-based licensing restrictions may erect barriers to the electronic flow of
expertise and information to and from qualified practitioners across state
lines, 12 and not just to unqualified health care providers. As observed in a
2004 joint Federal Trade Commission (FTC)/Department of Justice (DOJ)
report, "[t]he practice of telemedicine has ... crystallized tensions between
7. See infra Part II.A for a general discussion of what telemedicine entails. For now,
telemedicine services are treatment-related health care services, enabled by telecommunications or
IT technology, where providers and/or consumers are separated geographically or temporally.
Matthew S. Yeo, Distance Health Services Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 35
J. HEALTH L. 83, 85 (2002), available at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Publications/Journal/Documents/Vol351ssuel /JHL vol.35_no.1_Ye
o(Distance Health).pdf.
8. Ann K. Schooley, Note, Allowing FDA Regulation of Communications Software Used in
Telemedicine: A Potentially Fatal Misdiagnosis?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 731, 732-33 (1998).
9. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS (1997) [hereinafter TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO
CONGRESS], available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/telemed/index.htm (describing different
licensing standards and procedures that cater to local needs, and the complicated relationship that
might arise if telemedicine were subject to a federal licensing scheme).
10. See, e.g., A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 31 (describing the potential
benefits of telemedicine); Daniel J. Gilman & James C. Cooper, There is a Time to Keep Silent
and a Time to Speak, the Hard Part is Knowing Which is Which: Striking the Balance Between
Privacy Protection and the Flow of Health Care Information, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REV. 279, 286-95 (2010) (discussing generally the development and benefits of Health
Information Technology (HIT)).
11. See Ranney Wiesemann, Note, On-Line or On-Call? Legal and Ethical Challenges
Emerging in Cybermedicine, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1119, 1124-26 (1999) (discussing
telemedicine's effect on the traditional face-to-face provision of medical services and noting in
particular telemedicine's potential to broadly cohere the practice of medicine).
12. See Gilman & Cooper, supra note 10, at 343-44 (stating that variable state laws regarding
the privacy of patient information likely hinder the exchange of such information across state lines
and lead to increased costs associated with the use of telemedicine); P. Greg Gulick, E-Health and
the Future of Medicine: The Economic, Legal, Regulatory, Cultural, and Organizational
Obstacles Facing Telemedicine and Cybermedicine Programs, 12 ALB. L.J. SCi. & TECH. 351,
365-67 (2002) (detailing different state laws relating specifically to the use of telecommunications
in physician-to-patient and physician-to-physician consultations).
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the states' role in ensuring patients have access to quality care and the
anticompetitive effects of protecting in-state physicians from out-of-state
competition."1 3 The American Medical Association appears to agree.14
This paper revisits the competition perspective on licensing and
telemedicine in view of contemporary developments in health information
technology (HIT) and health policy.15 To that end, Part II provides brief
background introductions to: (a) telemedicine, (b) licensure, and (c) the
importance of consumer interests in competition law and policy.16 Part III
applies the competition perspective to licensure and telemedicine, and
surveys some of the available research on the costs and benefits of
licensing.17 Part III also argues that regulatory costs are substantial and, in
particular, that regulatory barriers to entry across state lines are under-
rationalized at best.18 Finally, Part IV briefly discusses possible policy
reforms. 19 One policy proposal discussed at the roundtable - federal
licensing and the preemption of state licensing requirements for physicians
- is both attractive and problematic. In brief, federal physician licensing is
attractive because the costs of variable entry requirements across the states
are substantial, unjustified, and, given the substantive harmonization of
basic qualifications, unlikely to offer much in the way of countervailing
consumer protection benefits. 20 It is problematic chiefly for institutional
reasons, rather than those related to state interests or prerogatives. There
are, of course, federal regulations pertaining to physician qualifications and
conduct, 21 and there is considerable federal expertise in health care
13. A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 32.
14. A recent AMA update notes that, " [t]elemedicine in particular has crystallized the tension
between the states' role in protecting patients from incompetent physicians and protecting in-state
physicians from out-of-state competition . . .." Physician Licensure: An Update of Trends, AM.
MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/member-groups-
sections/young-physicians-section/advocacy-resources/physician-licensure-an-update-trends.shtml
(last visited Dec. 29, 2010).
15. See infra Part II.A (providing an overview of HIT and a discussion of recent
developments in that field). See also, e.g., A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, exec.
summary, at 14, 22-23, ch. 2, at 25, 30-33 (discussing, among other things, competitive concerns
about state licensing of physicians).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part Ill.
18. See infra Part Ill.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Thomas R. McLean, The Future of Telemedicine and Its Faustian Reliance on
Regulatory Trade Barriers for Protection, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 462-63 (2006) (discussing
the high costs associated with state-based physician licensure and the protection from professional
competition that results from those high costs); Alison M. Sulentic, Crossing Borders: The
Licensure of Interstate Telemedicine Practitioners, 25 J. LEGIs. 1, 7-8 (1999) (detailing the
common requirements shared by most state-based physician licensing schemes).
21. See generally, 42 C.F.R. § 485 (2009) (providing several regulations relating to the
qualifications and conduct of medical personnel in facilities receiving Medicare reimbursements).
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matters. 22 There is not, however, a federal agency with the authority,
expertise, and experience to perform the various licensing functions
undertaken by the states, and it would be difficult to create one. It may be
unnecessary as well, as some form of mutual recognition or reciprocity
could reduce the costs of interstate commerce in health care services, while
leaving in place state-based mechanisms for physician oversight and
discipline.
Two brief caveats are offered at the outset. The first ought to be nearly
generic in health policy discussions, although it often enough is overlooked:
consumer interests and expectations in this space are very likely to be
heterogeneous. Both licensing and telemedicine may provide costs and
benefits that vary across health care consumers. 23
Second, in discussing the costs of licensure, this paper does not entail
or intend a criticism of basic licensing standards. That is, this paper is not
concerned with the general question whether the typical or average costs of
licensure tend to be justified by consumer benefits or with the relative
virtues of licensure and other means of regulating physician entry
(including, in the limit, deregulation). Early works by, for example, Milton
Friedman and Simon Kuznets, 24 George Stigler,25 Kenneth Arrow,26 and
Keith Leffler 27 provide important foundations for the ongoing study of
professional licensing generally and physician licensing in particular. They
do not, however, enable us to optimize existing entry requirements for
physicians or to sort between the relative advantages and disadvantages of
existing and proposed entry requirements. Abandoning licensure entirely
does not appear to be a live policy option. The policy questions at hand
concern not just the relative stringency of one set of entry requirements or
another, but the costs and benefits of variation in licensing requirements
22. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 24.4 (2009) (explaining that members of the Senior Biomedical
Research Service Policy Board must "have a doctoral-level degree in biomedicine" and "be
outstanding in the field of biomedical research or clinical research evaluation").
23. For example, there is some evidence that licensure offers more benefits to those
consumers who place more emphasis on the quality of their health care; there also is some
evidence that relatively stringent state licensing requirements tend to raise prices and reduce
access to care. A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 27.
24. MILTON FRIEDMAN & SIMON KUZNETS, INCOME FROM INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE (1954).
25. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SC. 3, 13-17 (1971) (describing licensing and its effects on the assertion of collective
political power of an occupation).
26. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941, 966-67 (1963).
27. See Leffler, supra note 3, at 185-86 (examining public interest perspectives of physician
licensure, and costs associated with the practice).
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and, in particular, in new regulatory restrictions on interstate telemedicine
practice via state licensing laws.
II. BACKGROUND: TELEMEDICINE, LICENSURE, AND COMPETITION
A. Telemedicine and HIT
In this discussion, "telemedicine" will be roughly co-extensive with
the application of HIT to patient health. "Telemedicine" itself is not well
defined, and that may be all for the best at its present stage of
development. 28 Informally, telemedicine is "the use of telecommunications
technology for medical, diagnostic, monitoring, and therapeutic purposes
when distance and/or time separates the participants." 29 On this general
view of medicine-at-a-distance, the conflation of telemedicine and HIT
should be easy enough to excuse. To deliver health services to remote
patients, a health care provider may use considerably more than occasional
telephone calls or broadband-enabled discussions between physicians and
patients. 30 A provider might make good use of, for example, real-time
access to a patient's electronic health record (EHR), drug prescription
information within the EHR, general electronic prescribing information,
practice guidelines, etc. 31 In some contexts, it might be medically important
that test data or images be accessible or transmissible from the patient's
home, from prior providers, or from primary or basic care givers to other
members of a health care team. 32 Patients could use personal health records,
as well as the ability to examine portions of their EHRs, to schedule
consultations, etc. Specialist consultation, in real-time or otherwise, might
be made available to remote primary care physicians or other advanced
health professionals (AHPs).33 The range of HIT tools applicable to
28. There is, at least, no general definition of the term under federal law, even though various
federal statutes and regulations provide for the implementation of telemedicine. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R.
§ 1703.101 (2010) (providing financial assistance to rural areas in order to facilitate
implementation of, and access to, telemedicine).
29. Telemedicine Activities at the Department ofHealth and Human Services: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Veterans Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of
Carolyn M. Clancy, Director, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/news/test5l805.htm.
30. See generally TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9, (noting that current
telemedicial practices now utilize traditional audio and advanced imaging capabilities).
31. Gilman & Cooper, supra note 10, at 288 & n.3 1.
32. Marcus V. M. Figueredo & Joao S. Dias, Mobile Telemedicine System for Home Care and
Patient Monitoring, 2 ENG'G IN MED. & BIOLOGY Soc'Y 3387, 3387 (2004), available at
http://www.di.ubi.pt/-paraujo/Telemedicina/MobileTelemedicineSystemforHomeCareandPatient
Monitoring.pdf (detailing the increasing number of individuals who would benefit from the
expanded home health care services provided by the use of telemedicine).
33. For example, at a 2008 FTC workshop regarding Innovations in Health Care Delivery, Dr.
Douglas Wood described initiatives at the Mayo Clinic to extend virtual consults to the United
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telemedicine is thus broad and open. From both policy and technical
standpoints, their fates are very much intertwined.
Incentives for providers to adopt such tools are considerable. For
example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery
Act or ARRA) 34 contemplates tens of billions of dollars in payments to
health care professionals and hospitals to implement, improve, and maintain
HIT under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 35 Most incentives are
structured to encourage relatively early adoption of interoperable HIT,
including EHRs, and, correspondingly, to discourage failures to adopt. 36
B. Licensure in Brief
Occupational regulation - restrictions on the provision of professional
services - takes various forms, with state law based licensure being the
most common. 37 "In a licensing system, boards sanctioned by the state
Arab Emirates, cardiac expertise, information, and treatment throughout its hospital system in
Minnesota, and specialist consultation to remote family physicians in rural Minnesota. FED.
TRADE COMM'N, INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 170-73 (2008) [hereinafter FTC
INNOVATIONS TRANSCRIPT], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/docs/hcdwksptranscript.pdf (statement of Dr. Douglas
Wood, Professor of Med., Mayo Clinic).
34. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is the short title of H.R.1,
"[m]aking supplemental appropriations for job preservation and creation, infrastructure
investment, energy efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal
stabilization, for fiscal year ending September 30, 2009, and for other purposes." American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 115 (2009). Pertinent
funding may be provided under the "HITECH ACT" portions of the ARRA or otherwise (e.g.,
broadband facilities funding elsewhere in the Act that may be devoted to the delivery of rural
health care). §§ 13001-13424, 6000, 123 Stat. at 226-79, 512-16 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
35. For these provisions in Division B, Title IV of the Recovery Act, CBO estimates net
outlays at $20.819 billion. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Hon.
Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Finance, tbl.2 (Mar. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/docl0008/03-02-MacroEffectsofARRA.pdf.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has estimated spending "$44.7 billion in
incentives through Medicare and Medicaid to encourage physicians and hospitals to adopt
certified electronic health record (EHR) technology." Fiscal Year 2010 Budget in Brief American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/asrt/ob/docbudget/2010budgetinbriefc.htmi (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
36. Incentives are in several regards time-sensitive. First, direct financial incentive payments
are not available past a certain threshold: "No incentive payments may be made under this
subsection with respect to a year after 2016," and "[i]f the first payment year for an eligible
professional is after 2014 then the applicable amount . . . for such professional for such year and
any subsequent year shall be $0." § 4101(a), 123 Stat. at 467-68. Furthermore, the statute
provides for certain reductions in scheduled fee payment amounts, for services provided under
Medicare, for an eligible provider who is "not a meaningful EHR user" in 2015 and subsequent
years. § 4101(b), 123 Stat. at 472.
37. CAROLYN COx & SUSAN FOSTER, FED. TRADE COMM'N, BUREAU OF ECON., THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 3 (1990), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/docs/reports/CoxFoster90.pdf.
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typically set entry requirements, enact rules governing conduct, and
discipline individuals for rule violations." 38 Such state boards are populated
mainly by representatives of the regulated professions themselves, although
many require the participation of some lay members as well. 39 A 1990
report issued by the FTC's Bureau of Economics observed that more than
800 occupations were subject to licensing in at least one of the fifty states,
with a core group of roughly sixty professions - including physicians and
other health professionals, attorneys, architects, engineers, and real estate
brokers - licensed by most states. 40
Each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S.
territories regulates the practice of medicine via licensure, which is
administered by their respective boards of medicine. 41 Generally, the
practice of medicine without such licensure is prohibited and subject to
criminal sanction by statute. 42 Particular licensing requirements vary
considerably across the states,43  but core entry requirements are
substantially uniform, with state boards and other professional associations
doing considerable work to harmonize the basic prerequisites to the practice
of medicine. 44 For example, different states require the payment of different
licensure fees (to different entities, of course) 45 and entry requirements vary
in permitting different amounts of time for passing mandatory entry exams
or in the number of times a candidate may retake an exam to achieve a
38. Id.
39. A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 25. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-
103 (2010) (providing that the Colorado medical board contain eleven physician members, one
physician assistant member, and four at-large public members).
40. Cox & FOSTER, supra note 37, at 3.
41. Physician Licensure: An Update of Trends, supra note 14.
42. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.327(l)(a) (West 2001) (stating that the "practice of
medicine or an attempt to practice medicine without a license to practice in Florida" constitutes a
felony of the third degree).
43. Physician Licensure: An Update of Trends, supra note 14.
44. FED. OF MED. REGULATORY AUTHS. OF CAN., FED. OF STATE MED. BDS. & MILBANK
MEM'L FUND, MEDICAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES AND THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL SERVICES
IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 7, 11-12 (2008) [hereinafter MEDICAL REGULATORY
AUTHORITIES], available at
http://www.milbank.org/reports/0806MedServicesCanada/0806MedServicesCanada.pdf
(discussing historical and current regulation of the U.S. and Canadian of the medical professions,
and noting common educational and examination requirements as well as the potential to create an
even more uniform system of regulation).
45. See generally Physician Licensure: An Update of Trends, supra note 15 (discussing
briefly the issue of fees in physician licensure). Compare, e.g., License Application Forms
Physician, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP'T OFFICE OF THE PROFESSIONS,
http://www.op.nysed.gov/prof/med/medforms/htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (stating that fees are
submitted to the New York State Department of Education), with Licensing Program, MED. BD.
OF CAL., http://www.medbd.ca.gov/applicant/application-intemational.pdf (last visited Jan. 3,
2011) (explaining that checks are to be made payable to the Medical Board of California and
include a mandatory payment to the Physician Corps Loan Repayment Program).
[VOL. 14:8794
2011] PHYSICIAN LICENSURE AND TELEMEDICINE 95
passing score.46 The underlying entry exam is the same, however: all state
medical boards recognize and require passage of the same sequence of tests
- the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) that is jointly
administered by the Federation of State Medical Boards and the National
Board of Medical Examiners. 47 In addition, required medical training tends
to reflect an increasingly common model of medical education in the
century since the Flexner Report, 48 and undergraduate medical education in
both the United States and Canada is subject to joint accreditation.49
Telemedicine is associated with a particular area of variation in
licensing requirements across the states. With the development of
telemedicine practices, a number of states have adopted special licensing-
based restrictions on the practice of telemedicine. 50 Although state laws
generally do not permit the practice of medicine without a license issued by
the state in which the health care service is delivered, 1 the relatively new
body of telemedicine regulations varies considerably with regard to the
question of which types of medical consultation count as the practice of
medicine. 52
46. AM. MED. ASs'N, STATE MEDICAL LICENSURE REQUIREMENTS AND STATISTICS, 2010 §
1 (2010) (table I shows time for passage clustering at seven years, ten years, and no time limits
across the states).
47. See generally FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., STATE OF THE STATES: PHYSICIAN
REGULATION 2009 3, 10-11 (2009) (explaining that the Federation of State Medical Boards
("FSMB") administers the USMLE required by state boards and noting initiatives to streamline
and harmonize licensing and make licensure more portable); U.S. MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION
(USMLE), 2011 BULLETIN OF INFORMATION 1 (2011), available at
http://www.usmle.org/General _nformation/bulletin/2011/201 IBOI.pdf (detailing the purposes of
the USMLE and indicating that it provides state licensing boards with a common method of
applicant evaluation). Commonly, a state statutory provision requires passage of an examination
approved by the state board, and regulations promulgated by the board stipulate that the USMLE
is the approved exam. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.017(1)(c) (West 2001) (Florida board to
approve national exam by rule); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.64B8-5.001 (2008), available at
https://www.flrules.org/gateway/ruleNo.asp?id=64B8-5.001 (Board of Medicine "approves and
designates" the USMLE).
48. MEDICAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES, supra note 44, at 3. For a copy of the Flexner
Report and its findings, see ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA, A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING (1910), available at
http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/elibrary/CarnegieFlexner Report.pdf.
49. MEDICAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES, supra note 44, at 3.
50. See generally TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS , supra note 9, at ch. III (noting that
state licensing laws are viewed as an obstacle to widespread use of telemedicine). See also
Physician Licensure: An Update of Trends, supra note 14 (providing a non-exhaustive survey of
state provisions regarding telemedicine and licensure).
51. See Physician Licensure: An Update of Trends, supra note 14 (stating that state laws
generally require that a physician hold a license in the state where the patient is being treated).
52. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-31 (2008) (requiring Georgia licensure if care is
delivered within Georgia, although permitting certain limited exceptions), and KAN. ADMIN.
REGS. § 100-26-1 (2010), available at http://www.ksbha.org/regulations/article26.html (citing
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Licensure may be an efficient response to several potential types of
market failure. First, when there are information asymmetries between
professionals and consumers and quality information is costly, professionals
may be insulated against the competitive disadvantages of offering lower
quality services, and at the same time unable to capture the gains associated
with higher quality services. 53 Licensing provides one possible regulatory
response, at least to the extent that it offers consumers some assurance of
minimum quality. Second, licensure may address some quality and
consumption problems in markets where externalities are striking - where
providers or consumers are not likely to take into account the effects of
services on third-parties. 54 Minimum standards of care may ameliorate, for
example, the public health consequences of substandard care or under-
treatment.55 Third, licensure may help to address problems associated with
professionals who play the dual roles of diagnostician and treatment
provider.56 In such cases - and especially when there are third-party payers,
when pricing is based on the quantity of services purchased, and when the
service offered is highly technical - there may be a bias toward
overconsumption: providers may tend to offer more services than necessary
to consumers, who often are poorly equipped to evaluate the marginal value
of additional services and, in any case, may be insulated from some of the
costs of overconsumption. 57
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2802(a) (2010)) (generally providing that a physician who diagnoses or
prescribes medication for any condition in any manner is considered engaged in the practice of
medicine in Kansas), with HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 453-1.3(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009)
(providing generally for the practice of telemedicine and requiring that any physician who has
established a patient-physician relationship with a patient in Hawaii obtain a license to practice
medicine in Hawaii).
53. Cox & FOSTER, supra note 37, at 5-6.
54. Id. at 9-10.
55. See Id. at 10 (discussing generally how poor quality services can result in the absence of
professional licensing); The Center for Telemedicine Law, Telemedicine and Interstate Licensure:
Findings and Recommendations of the CTL Licensure Task Force, 73 N.D. LAW REV. 109, 113-
14 (1997) (describing the disparities in quality of health care that were mitigated by the advent of
physician licensing).
56. See Cox & FOSTER, supra note 37 at 11-12 (describing the general problems facing
physicians who both diagnose and treat, and arguing that those problems are greater when there
are third-party payers).
57. Id, at 12-13. Some of these difficulties are captured by the notion of "credence" goods or
services, "those which, although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use." See Michael R.
Darby & Edi Kari, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount ofFraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-
69 (1973) (using surgery to remove an appendix as an example of a medical service that contains
"credence qualities" because it requires the person having his appendix removed to know whether
it is diseased before the surgery takes place). As James Cooper has pointed out, there is an
overconsumption equilibrium for credence goods when consumers cannot purchase diagnosis and
treatment from separate parties. James C. Cooper, Public Versus Private Restraints on the Online
Distribution of Contact Lenses: A Distinction with a Difference, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 331, 343-
44 (2007).
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Licensure is not always, however, an efficient response to these types
of market failure. Moreover, licensure may be associated with certain
competitive problems. Most generally, licensure may be used by incumbent
professionals to insulate themselves from competition. As George Stigler
noted in 1971, licensure "is an effective barrier to entry because
occupational practice without the license is a criminal offense."58 By
restricting the entry of competing professionals, licensure can restrict
supply, which can increase the income of incumbents (at consumer
expense) or decrease the pressure on incumbents to improve non-price
aspects of their services, such as quality or convenience. 59 On this model,
licensure is not an efficient response to market failure, but an example of
legislative or regulatory "capture" by concentrated professional interests.60
Part III of this paper examines some of the empirical evidence that is
available on the effects of physician licensure in particular. 61 Here, it is.
noted that physician licensure may offer pro-consumer benefits, anti-
consumer harms, or some mixture of the two. 62 Health care markets - and
physician services markets in particular - have some of the hallmarks of
areas in which occupational licensure may be an efficient response to
market failure.63 At the same time, different licensing provisions may be
more or less efficient responses to market failure.64 Moreover, concentrated
physician interests may be well suited to the anti-consumer capture model
of occupational licensing.
58. Stigler, supra note 25, at 13.
59. Id. at 13-14 (discussing the income variable in professional licensing); Cox & FOSTER,
supra note 37 at 18-20 (arguing that income is a significant factor in professionals' desire for
regulation via licensing); Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189,
192 (2000) ("The most generally held view on the economics of occupational licensing is that it
restricts the supply of labor to the occupation and thereby drives up the price of labor as well as of
services rendered."). See generally FRIEDMAN & KUZNETS, supra note 24 (reporting on an early
study of income effects of restrictions on professional entry in five professions, including
medicine).
60. See Kleiner, supra note 59, at 192 (suggesting that members of professions use state
legislatures or local governments to control entry via licensing); Stigler, supra note 25, at 13-18
(providing a detailed analysis of the manner in which members of an occupation can use political
processes to improve their positions).
61. See infra Part III.
62. See discussion infra Part IILA.
63. See Deborah Haas-Wilson, Arrow and the Information Market Failure in Health Care:
The Changing Content and Sources of Health Care Information, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
1031, 1032-33 (2001) (discussing information asymmetries between doctors and patients).
64. See Gregory Dolin, Note, Licensing Health Care Professionals: Has the United States
Outlived the Need for Medical Licensure?, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 315, 320-27 (2004)
(providing a detailed discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of physician licensing).
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C. Consumer Interests and the Competition Perspective
Concerns about legal impediments to telemedicine go to the nexus of
competition and consumer protection policy. Even the briefest introduction
to antitrust law and economics principles would, of course, go well beyond
the scope of this paper. For present purposes, it is useful to revisit the
central role of consumer interests in competition law and policy, especially
as many discussions of telemedicine policy focus chiefly on institutional
planning or competing regulatory interests.
Both competition and consumer protection issues are important to
physician licensure, telemedicine, and health care more generally.65 We
want to understand the consumer interests at stake in adequate physician
licensing standards, but, equally, we want to understand the consumer
interests at stake in efficient licensure. We want to avoid excess,
unnecessary costs, and impediments to competition, as they may tend to
increase prices and decrease access to health care goods and services. 66 The
advantages to a joint competition/consumer protection perspective are
numerous. As John Fingleton, head of the United Kingdom's Office of Fair
Trading, has explained, competition analysis (and regulation) benefits from
consumer protection's grasp of concrete consumer harms and real consumer
behaviors; and consumer protection analysis benefits from competition
policy's resistance to the rush to regulate, its ability to identify the costs of
intervention, its understanding of the private sector, and its economic
rigor.67
A competition perspective also implies a key baseline commitment to
consumer welfare when scrutinizing either private or public conduct.
Consumer welfare is, of course, a foundational concern in consumer
protection law. It is equally fundamental to competition analysis. 68 ,In its
design and function," the rule of reason approach that dominates antitrust
analysis "distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that
65. See infra Part IlIl.A.
66. See generally Thomas Bodenheimer, High and Rising Health Care Costs Part 1: Seeking
an Explanation, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 847, 849-52 (2005) (discussing generally issues of
access, cost, and competition in heath care markets).
67. John Fingleton, Chief Exec., U.K. Office of Fair Trading, Remarks at the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission (June 27, 2010). Among foreign competition agencies, the U.K. Office of Fair
Trading is distinctive in that it has broad jurisdiction over both competition and consumer
protection matters in the United Kingdom, much as the FTC does in the United States. Enterprise
Act, 2002, c. 40 (U.K.). Fingleton's remarks apply to the institutional advantages offered by an
agency - such as the Office of Fair Trading or the FTC - that has jurisdiction over both
competition and consumer protection matters. Fingleton, Remarks at U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n. I
suggest here that those advantages can be generalized to the cross-fertilization of competition and
consumer protection policy analyses more generally.
68. See, e.g., John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 3-4 & n.6
(1995) (discussing the tightly-bound concepts of competition and consumer welfare).
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are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are
in the consumer's best interest." 69 Prohibited exclusionary conduct, for
example, is conduct that has an anticompetitive effect - one that will "harm
the competitive process and thereby consumers." 70 The general focus is
captured neatly in the title of an article by Robert Lande, Proving the
Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just
to Increase Efficiency).71
III. LOOKING AT LICENSURE FROM THE COMPETITION PERSPECTIVE
A. Competition and Consumer Interests
There are special consumer protection concerns in the realm of
medical practice in particular, and the antitrust laws have long demonstrated
some consideration for the norms and goals of the learned professions.72
These observations do not, however, lessen the reach or the importance of
the antitrust laws to health care or health care professionals. Beginning with
the seminal 1943 decision in American Medical Association v. United
States,73 the Supreme Court has come to recognize the importance of
competition, and the application of antitrust principles, to health care. 74 Not
incidentally, the FTC's contemporary health care competition program has
roots in its 1970s case against the American Medical Association,
concerning restrictions on advertising and pricing.75 Since then, the
69. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (identifying
primacy and nature of rule of reason in holding that vertical restraints on price should be subject to
rule of reason analysis, rather than per se condemnation). The alternative, and more limited, per se
condemnation of conduct as anticompetitive is not at odds with the core of the rule of reason.
Rather, it is applied when courts, based on considerable experience with certain conduct, "can
predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of
reason." Id. at 886-87.
70. Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See, e.g., Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (condemning the FTC's x-ray
policy as anticompetitive because it impaired "the ability of the market to advance social welfare .
71. Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect
Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959 (1999).
72. See, e.g., Nat'1 Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (noting
that that nature of competition within professional services might be different from the nature of
competition within the traditional business arena).
73. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
74. Id. at 528, 536 (holding that a group of physicians and a medical association were not
exempted by the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Acts from the operations of the Sherman
Act, although declining to reach the question whether a physician's practice of his or her
profession constitutes trade under the meaning of Section 3 of the Sherman Act).
75. Interview by Patrick Thompson with William E. Kovacic, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n
(June 30, 2008), available at http://ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/2008kovacicintrvwc.pdf.
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antitrust agencies 76 have investigated the competitive effects of restrictions
on the business practices of health care providers.7 7 The FTC has, for
example, targeted attempts by provider-controlled licensing boards to limit
competition to the detriment of health care consumers.7 8 Anticompetitive
misuse of credentialing and privileging has been the target of both
enforcement actions79 and private litigation. 80
Consumers may have both positive interests and serious concerns
about the impact of licensing requirements.81 What might consumers want
from physician licensure? 82 Consumers might want some form of public
assurance about minimum standards of quality for medical care they
receive. Substandard care may be disastrous, but information is costly, and
reliable information about health care quality often is hard to obtain.83
Moreover, information asymmetries between providers and patients can be
substantial. 84
76. In the United States, the antitrust laws are jointly enforced by the FTC and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice. FED. TRADE COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST
ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/03I0hcupdate.pdf.
77. See id (describing the FTC's Health Care Division, which is dedicated to addressing
health care antitrust matters).
78. See, e.g., S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 455 F.3d 436, 440-43, 447
(4th Cir. 2006) (upholding FTC action against a board of dentistry following the board's
promulgation of an emergency regulation that prevented oral hygienists from performing certain
services in a school setting unless a dentist first examined the student and prescribed a course of
treatment).
79. See, e.g., In re Med. Staff of Mem'l Med. Ctr., 1987 FTC Lexis 9, *6 9 (1987)
(addressing a challenge to a hospital's denial of credentials to a nurse-midwife and finding that
"[c]onsumers have been limited in their ability to choose among alternative types of health care
providers competing on the basis of price and quality.").
80. See, e.g., Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514, 1519 (11th Cir.
1993) (reversing judgment notwithstanding the verdict because, on de novo review, "there was
evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the hospital conspired with members of its
medical staff and peer review committees . .. to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act.").
81. See, e.g., Cox & FOSTER, supra note 37 at v (suggesting that although occupational
licensing might protect public health and safety, it can also result in significant consumer costs).
82. Interestingly, studies have shown that medical professionals tend to be the driving force
behind the enactment of licensing regulation, and research also has shown the income-enhancing
effects of licensure. See id at 19-20 & nn.55-60 (discussing research that has demonstrated
professionals' desire for regulation and its attendant effects on professional incomes).
83. See, e.g., A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, ch. 1, at 18 ("[I]n health care .
[quality] information is often difficult to obtain and is not necessarily reliable."); Paul B.
Ginsburg, Shopping for Price in Medical Care, 26 HEALTH AFF. w208, w209 (2007) ("[L]imited
credible quality data are constraining the degree to which consumers are willing to consider price
when choosing providers.").
84. See SHERMAN FOLLAND ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 343 (4th ed. 2004)
(explaining the public interest motive for regulation, which results where patients have limited
information relating to quality and cost); Cox & FOSTER, supra note 37, at 4-16 (discussing
rationales for licensure including asymmetric information on quality).
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Consumers might have concerns about licensure too. For example,
consumers might not want misleading or opaque signals about health care
quality. 85 Also, consumers likely do not want their health care to be more
costly or more difficult to access than it is already.86 These very
understandable consumer concerns may be heightened, for example, in
certain geographic areas or, looking forward, if one projects overall
shortages of primary care or generalist physicians.87 Hence, consumers
should want to avoid licensing that adds undue costs, needless restrictions
on the scope of service, or excessive barriers to entry for health care service
providers. If licensing is inefficient in its design or implementation,
misdirected in its regulatory focus, or misused for anticompetitive ends, it
can do precisely those things.88
Consumers may have substantial interests in the further development
and deployment of telemedicine as well. Telemedicine may provide better
access to health care services and health care information - easier
85. For a general discussion of choice architecture and mapping problems for health care
choices, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS, 81-100 (2008). Among legislative initiatives to improve
quality reporting and make publicly available information clearer to consumers are, for example,
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA") Sections 3002 and 3003 (to improve the
physician quality and feedback reporting systems, respectively) and 3015 (strategic framework for
quality and efficiency data collection, with data to be made available to the public on standardized
Internet websites). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3002,
3003, 3015, 124 Stat. 119, 363-68, 387-89 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
86. Myriad sources document general consumer concerns about price and value in health care
services markets. See generally PIERRE L. YOUNG & LEIGHANNE OLSEN, INST. OF MED., THE
HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE: LOWERING COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES (2010) (discussing in
detail the ill-effects of steadily-rising health care costs on both governments and individuals).
Legislative response to such public concerns has been substantial too, however one assesses the
particulars of the response. For example, throughout the PPACA are provisions aimed at
improving price and quality, as well as value transparency in health care. §§ 1001, 1003, 124 Stat.
135-37, 139-40.
87. See, e.g., Jack M. Colwill et al., Will Generalist Physician Supply Meet Demands of an
Increasing and Aging Population?, 27 HEALTH AFF. w232, w237 (2008) (regarding the supply of
primary care physicians).
88. The FTC advocacy page contains numerous examples of FTC staff analyses that seek to
limit undue regulatory restraints on health care competition. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM'N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE AND CERTIFICATED OF NEED 2-3 (2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/VO80018illconlaws.pdf (regarding competitive issues
raised by certificate of need regulations); Letter from Fed. Trade Comm'n Staff to Jill Brown, Off.
of Legal Servs., Ky. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. 2 (Jan. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/02/100202kycomment.pdf (regarding competitive impact of
regulatory restrictions on scope of practice within limited service clinics); Letter from Fed. Trade
Comm'n Staff to Hon. Timothy Burns, La. House of Representatives 2-3 (May 1, 2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/05/VO90009 louisianadentistry.pdf (regarding proposed
restrictions on mobile dentistry); Advocacy Filings By Date, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/advocacydate.shtm (last visited Jan. 4, 2011) (listing an index of
advocacy filings across industries and markets).
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geographic access, more timely access, more choice, and more affordable
care, to the extent that telemedicine efficiencies tend to lower provider costs
and consumer prices. 89 Many have argued that telemedicine and the growth
of HIT are critical to improving quality and efficiency in health care
delivery.90 For example, it appears that HIT has the potential to reduce
medical errors, 91 duplicative testing and procedures, 92 and substantial
administrative costs now attributed to incomplete, hard-to-find, or faulty
paper records. 93 That is not to say that the issues involved with the adoption
and implementation of telemedicine are trivial or unproblematic. 94 Potential
benefits may sometimes go unrealized, but they are real nonetheless, and
have been demonstrated in various contexts.95 Undue impediments to
consumption of those benefits are unwanted.
Brown Shoe's oft-cited dictum, that the purpose of the antitrust laws is
"the protection of competition, not competitors," 96 does not, of course,
mean that the impact of regulations on providers is irrelevant from a
competition perspective. 97 Trivially, health care providers and professionals
may themselves be consumers in one or another health or HIT-related
89. See Schooley, supra note 8, at 732-33 (arguing that telemedicine will widely benefit the
provision of health care, including access, treatment, and cost).
90. See, e.g., Richard Hillestad et al., Can Electronic Medical Record Systems Transform
Health Care? Potential Health Benefits, Savings, and Costs, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1103-05,
1107-08 (2005) (noting that the all the benefits of HIT are currently unclear but suggesting that
there might be significant-if unpredictable-health care savings involved in its use).
91. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., REPORT BRIEF: PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS 1 (2006)
(estimating a minimum of 1.5 million preventable medication errors per year in hospitals, nursing
homes, and ambulatory care settings in U.S.). The IOM has also identified HIT as a promising
means of reducing the frequency of such errors. Id. at 3.
92. See id. (discussing the importance of eRx(Electronic Prescriptions) and other HIT in
reducing medication errors).
93. See id. (emphasizing the importance of maintaining accurate patient and prescription
information as it travels between the physician's office, the pharmacy, the nursing home, etc.).
94. See generally Gilman & Cooper, supra note 10, at 290, 295 (including an overview of the
potential costs and benefits associated with HIT adoption, with a focus on regulatory costs and
impediments to HIT adoption).
95. See, e.g., id at 292 & nn. 50-54 (discussing the benefits of HIT in health care delivery
organizations); see also U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-0224, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY: BENEFITS REALIZED FOR SELECTED HEALTH CARE FUNCTIONS 13 (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04224.pdf (identifying "20 IT initiatives associated
with health care organizations that resulted in reported cost savings or other benefits"); David W.
Bates et al., The Impact of Computerized Physician Order Entry on Medication Error Prevention,
6 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS'N 313, 314, 320 (1999) (evaluating the impact of electronic
physician order entry on medication error rates and exploring possible changes for future
implementation of this HIT).
96. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
97. For a general discussion of varying economic interests at stake in licensing, see Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 217-18 (1976)
(expressing skepticism about the unique relevance of either efficiency or cartel model of
regulation).
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market. They also may provide key, expert input regarding the operation
and effects of competitive constraints. But more than that, even if we focus
especially on the patient - who is the end-consumer of typical telemedicine
services - limits on health care providers may directly impact the quality,
price, or availability of services.
Revisiting the case study offered at the Roundtable, we might
consider, for example, the interests of an academic medical center (AMC)
in providing telemedicine services to underserved rural communities
throughout the western United States. First, an AMC might seek to provide
care to (and seek revenue from) remote patients who would not otherwise
have access to specialized care or other resources offered by a tertiary care
center. Such patients might be new to the AMC, or might be patients
previously referred to an AMC practice for an episode of care - patients
who might well benefit from ongoing, integrated, specialized health care
that is unavailable where they live. 98 Second, the AMC might seek to
distribute its expertise to remote primary care practices or monitor chronic
conditions, providing more regular and thorough oversight of patient
conditions than feasible with face-to-face contact.99 The AMC might be
interested in grant resources too, including those available under the
Recovery Act. 00 The AMC also might seek to expand its base of referring
health care providers or affiliates, or to develop new training opportunities
for its students, residents, fellows, and other AHPs.
What might be some of the center's concerns? All of the regulatory
concerns about its own in-state practice may carry over to new settings, as
may liability concerns. 10 1 A provider might, for example, be concerned
both about additional exposure to potential malpractice claims and about
whether, or to what extent, existing malpractice coverage protects against
claims relating to novel practice contexts.102 Second, regulatory burdens
may vary considerably across state lines. 103 That may constrain an AMC's
service delivery and professional staffing in ways that differ from one
jurisdiction to the next. It also raises an AMC's risk profile in several ways.
98. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., FTC INNOVATIONS TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 203-06 (statement of
Thomas Berg, Marshfield Clinic, regarding patient input into electronic diabetes management).
100. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., LINDA L. DIMITROPOULOS, PRIVACY AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR
INTEROPERABLE HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE: NATIONWIDE SUMMARY 6-11 (2007),
available at http://www.rti.org/pubs/nationwide summary.pdf (discussing provider concerns
about liability, risk management, and regulatory obligations); Gilman & Cooper, supra note 10, at
333 34 & nn. 286-94 (regarding liability concerns and HIT).
102. A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 32.
103. See, e.g., Linda Dimitropoulos & Stephanie Rizk, A State-Based Approach to Privacy and
Security for Interoperable Health Information Exchange, 28 HEALTH AFF. 428, 428 29 (2009)
(noting issues in accommodating state-level variation in health information privacy regulation).
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Additional states means a larger matrix of potential liability. It also implies
increased uncertainty about the choice of law in complex interstate matters
and, not incidentally, the degree of expertise the AMC might have - either
in-house or otherwise - about its possible exposure to public disciplinary
action, private suit, or both. And, depending on the nature of any given
connection, there may be uncertainty about the actual - and jurisdictional -
location of any given patient or practitioner. 104 These species of uncertainty
are themselves costly. Moreover, when relevant state and federal
regulations are not clear, parties may over-comply to avoid liability. 0 5
Areas of potential regulatory concern are many. For example, health
privacy regulation not only has a federal baseline in HIPAA,' 0 6 the
ARRA,107 and the FTC Act, 0 8 but also has myriad state law components -
not generally preempted by federal law - with the particulars varying
greatly from state to state. 109 Many states have fragmented sets of privacy
laws, including provisions drafted for non-health contexts and prior to the
advent of the Internet, that may be applicable to health information or
104. See Schooley, supra note 8, at 734 (noting that the practice of telemedicine is not bound
by state lines and discussing the jurisdictional issues that result for licensing and malpractice
insurance purposes).
105. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 224-29 (2004)
(discussing behavior where the duty of care is uncertain and parties misperceive or overestimate
the level of care expected of them).
106. Federal health privacy regulation under HIPAA generally refers to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and its implementing regulations. Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§ 261 264, 110 Stat.
1936, 2021-34 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d, 1320d-1320d-8, 1320d-2 (2008)); 45
C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 164 (2009).
107. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001-13424, 123 Stat.
115, 226-79 (discussing HIT generally in Div. A, Tit. XIII, and HIT privacy and data security in
Tit. XII, Subtit. D).
108. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717, 717-24
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)). See also In re Eli Lilly & Co., File No. 012
3214, Agreement Containing Consent Order (Jan. 18, 2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/01/lillyagree.pdf. (ordering Eli Lily & Company to establish and
maintain a security program to protect the personal information of its customers that purchased
pharmaceutical and other health related products and services from the company). See also In re
Eli Lilly & Co., Docket No. C-4047, Decision and Order (May 8, 2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillydo.htm (settling case alleging disclosure of personal health
information inconsistent with stated security policies, in violation of FTC Act).
109. See generally DIMOTROPOULOS, supra note 101, at 6-3 (citing variation among state laws
relating to privacy of health information as a factor to consider in the creation and implementation
of health exchanges). For a general overview of state law provisions, see JOY PRITrS ET AL., INST.
FOR HEALTH CARE RES. & POL'Y, GEO. UNIV., THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY: A SURVEY OF
STATE HEALTH PRIVACY STATUTES (2d ed. 2003), available at
http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/privacy/pdfs/statereportl.pdf and
http://ihcrp.georgetown.edulprivacy/pdfs/statereport2.pdf.
2011] PHYSICIAN LICENSURE AND TELEMEDICINE 105
telecommunications. 10 Not incidentally, some states have special privacy
and disclosure requirements pertaining to telemedicine. 11
Non-reciprocal state licensing requirements, as well as variation in
licensing requirements across the states, can also raise regulatory costs. 112
Many of these costs are associated with questions about the unauthorized
practice of medicine. 113 At the most basic level, a given course of
treatment, performed by a given practitioner, might be regarded by a state
board as lawful practice meeting the gold-standard of care or, in the
alternative, the unauthorized practice of medicine. Which view prevails
may depend essentially on the question whether state A or B has issued a
license to the practitioner;' 14 it may be wholly independent of the question
whether the two states' entry requirements or practice standards are
substantially different. Such substantive differences may be viewed as small
and shrinking - as noted above, all state medical boards recognize and
require passage of the same sequence of USMLE tests1 15 and medicat
110. See DIMOTROPOULOS, supra note 101, at 6-3 (discussing the ways in which state privacy
laws vary).
111. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123149.5 (West 2006) (telemedicine data included
in a patient's medical record); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-801(d)(4) (West 2008)
(telemedicine data included in a patient's medical record); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §
6804(A)(4) (West 2009) (requiring providers to give telemedicine patients "[a] statement that
patient access to all medical information transmitted during a telemedicine interaction is
guaranteed, and that copies of this information are available at stated costs, which shall not exceed
the direct cost of providing the copies . . . .").
112. See TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9 ("[S]tate licensure laws are
perceived as a barrier to the expansion of this type of health care practice in many parts of the
country.").
113. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-31 (2008) (requiring Georgia licensure if care is
delivered within Georgia, including where care is delivered electronically or via
telecommunications, although permitting certain limited exceptions); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 100-
26-1 (2010), available at http://www.ksbha.org/regulations/article26.html (regulating the practice
of medicine, including telemedicine services, and requiring Kansas licensure, although permitting
certain exceptions for communications "incidental" to services lawfully provided elsewhere that
are transmitted to certain persons in Kansas).
114. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-34-31, 43-34-31.1 (2008) (providing practice of medicine and
licensure requirements pertaining to location of patient); see also Christopher Guttman-McCabe,
Comment, Telemedicine's Imperiled Future? Funding, Reimbursement, Licensing and Privacy
Hurdles Face a Developing Technology, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 161, 169-71 (1997)
(discussing generally the uncertainty surrounding physicians' authorization to practice inter-state
via telemedicine).
115. See, e.g., FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 47, at 9-11, 25-26 (stating that the
FSMB administers USMLE required by state boards and noting initiatives to streamline and
harmonize licensing and make licensure more portable); U.S. MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION
(USMLE), 2010 BULLETIN OF INFORMATION I (2009), available at
http://www.usmle.org/GeneralInformation/bulletin/2010/2010bulletin.pdf (providing details
about the USMLE).
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training and preparatory training itself has tended to reflect an increasingly
common model of medical education. 116
There are further potential complications. For example, input into a
case by a remote practitioner might be regarded as mere consultation under
one state system, but the practice of medicine under another.117 Certain
conduct by other AHiPs - such as psychologists, psychiatric social workers,
or advanced practice nurses - might be regarded as within the scope of their
respective licensures in some states but not others. 118 As noted above, these
regulatory concerns impose direct compliance costs, can limit entry or the
scope of practice, and may in many cases prompt concerns about potential
civil liability for health care providers - both individual practitioners and
the provider institutions that employ them, or with which they are
affiliated. 19
B. The Costs and Benefits of State Licensure
Consistent with their policy missions, the antitrust agencies (FTC and
DOJ jointly) held twenty-seven days of hearings on competitive issues in
health care in 2003.120 On the basis of those hearings, an FTC sponsored
workshop, and independent research, 121 the agencies issued the 2004
Report, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition (A Dose of
Competition).122 The Report examined the role of competition in addressing
the challenges facing U.S. health care, 123 and broadly concluded that, just
116. See MEDICAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES, supra note 44 (noting the similarities between
the regulation of and educational requirements for the medical profession in the U.S. and Canada).
I 17. See supra note 52 (comparing medical profession regulations in Kansas and Hawaii).
118. See, e.g., Brian Dulisse & Jerry Cromwell, No Harm Found When Nurse Anesthetists
Work Without Supervision by Physicians, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1469, 1469-70 (2010) (describing
states where nurse anesthetists may provide anesthesiology services without physician supervision
versus those where they may not).
119. Analogous concerns about scope of practice limitations have been raised regarding limits
on the scope of practice permissible in certain clinic settings. For example, certain states have
contemplated restrictions on the scope of practice permissible for advance practice nurses in
limited service clinics, which typically employ telemedicine for consultation, supervision, and
quality control by remote physicians. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm'n to Jill Brown,
supra note 88, at 1-2 (addressing regulations placing restrictions on scope of practice within
limited service clinics).
120. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, DOJ/FTC Hearings to Focus on Health Care and
Competition Law and Policy (Feb. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2003/200808.htm.
121. For an example of independent research that the FTC and DOJ considered, see Cox &
FOSTER, supra note 37.
122. A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, exec. summary, at 1.
123. The 2004 Report addressed two basic questions: "First, what is the current role of
competition in health care, and how can it be enhanced to increase consumer welfare? Second,
how has, and how should, antitrust enforcement work to protect existing and potential competition
in health care?" Id. at exec. summary, at 1-2.
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as in other areas of the economy, "[v]igorous competition, both price and
non-price, can have important benefits in health care as well."1 24 At the
same time, the Report noted that certain barriers to competition had limited
consumers' ability to enjoy the fruits of competition in health care.125
Among the barriers noted were, (1) information problems, (2) third-party
payment, to the extent that it distorts competitive incentives, (3) agency
problems, and (4) some of the extensive regulation of health care.126
Among other regulatory costs, the Report examined those associated
with licensure and certification, as well as special state restrictions on
telemedicine. 127 As noted above, licensure's impact on competition stems
from the fact that, through licensure, state boards can restrict market entry
by physicians and AHPs, and can limit the scope of practice of those
professionals once licensed. 128 Studies have shown that state-based
licensure can harm consumer welfare by limiting provider mobility, in
addition to imposing other barriers to entry. 129
Boards tend to be dominated by particular industry representatives -
incumbent providers of health care services in their markets.130 This
permits expert input into minimum standards, but also raises a core
concern: "[b]ecause most board members are industry participants with
economic interests at stake, the potential exists for the board to make
decisions that are contrary to consumers' interests." 1 31 Such providers may
be unduly biased against competition from out-of-state practitioners, new
modes of practice, or allied professions.132 And while providing expert
opinion in certain regards, that expertise might be over-narrow. For
example, providers might fail adequately to represent other disciplinary
approaches to important health policy issues. Providers' expertise may also
fail to represent adequately the broad spectrum of citizen interests. It has
been argued that competition would be better served if the membership of
licensing boards were broader. 133
124. Id. at exec. summary, at 4.
125. Id. at exec. summary, at 4-7.
126. Id.
127. Id. at ch. 2, at 25-28, 30-33.
128. Id. at ch. 2, at 25 26.
129. Id. at ch. 2, at 28 & n.202.
130. Id at ch. 2, at 25-26.
131. Id at ch. 2, at 29.
132. Idat29&n.210.
133. Id. at ch. 2, at 30. Discussing analogous problems for the allied health professions, the
Institute of Medicine (IOM), for example, has recommended that "states strengthen the
accountability and broaden the public basis of their regulatory mechanisms." COMM. TO STUDY
THE ROLE OF ALLIED HEALTH PERS., INST. OF MED., ALLIED HEALTH SERVICES: AVOIDING
CRISES 256 (1989), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309038960/html/Rl.html#pagetop.
The IOM has also recommended increased board representation from without the regulated
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More recent hearings and workshops have continued the inquiry. For
example, in 2008, the FTC hosted a public workshop called Innovations in
Health Care Delivery (Innovations Workshop), which focused substantially
on HIT-related issues. 134 Several panelists identified state licensure
requirements as among the regulatory barriers that may slow HIT
implementation and the practice of telemedicine, 135 consistent with earlier
reports from other government agencies.136
The empirical record on the costs and benefits of physician licensure is
limited and could be - should be - further developed. As noted in the
introduction to this paper, early research on the costs and benefits of
licensure and cartel effects in physician licensing, etc.,137 provide important
foundations for the ongoing study of professional licensing generally and
physician licensing in particular. It does not, however, resolve present
policy questions about the relative advantages among existing licensing
systems, about how best to harmonize or streamline licensure, or about how
best to lower barriers to interstate practice of medicine and telemedicine. In
addition, it does not resolve the costs and benefits of variation in licensing
requirements or, in particular, to new regulatory restrictions on interstate
telemedicine practice via state licensing laws.
In broad terms, we want not just evidence regarding the general effects
of licensing, but about the marginal effects of changes in licensing
standards. Pertinent effects include not only effects on physician entry, but
also effects on how physicians practice - selection into different specialty
practices, selection into different regulatory jurisdictions, time spent with
patients, etc., and not just on practicing physicians but on the end-
consumers of their services - effects on patient access, frequency of
profession, including diverse members of the public and those who can bring to bear a variety of
areas of expertise, such as health administration, economics, consumer affairs, education, and
health services research. Id. at 250. The FTC/DOJ Report suggested that the IOM's
recommendations could, if followed, help to ameliorate some of the competitive concerns
associated with licensure. A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, at ch. 2, at 30.
134. See Innovations in Health Care Delivery, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/index.shtm (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (providing links to the
April 24, 2008 Innovations Workshop agenda, a complete transcript of the Workshop, supporting
materials, and public comments).
135. See, e.g., FTC INNOVATIONS TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 176 (statement of Douglas L.
Wood, Professor of Med., Mayo Clinic) (discussing the Mayo Clinic's concerns about
telemedicine practice across state lines); id. at 268-69 (statement of Robert M. Kolodner, Nat'l
Coordinator, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.) (identifying licensure and cross-state
licensure as policy problems to be solved to enable interoperable HIT and telemedicine).
136. See, e.g., OFFICE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TELEHEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., 2001 TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS 21, 24 (2001) [hereinafter 2001
TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS] (noting that state-based telemedicine licensure laws make
it difficult for the practice of telemedicine to grow across state lines).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
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treatment, choice of substitute providers from among AHPs and others,
etc.138 There is evidence that licensing generally increases costs for
consumers. 139 There also is evidence that state-based licensure can serve as
a barrier to provider mobility, to the detriment of consumer welfare. 140
Evidence of licensure's impact on the quality of care is mixed, and less well
developed.141 There is some evidence regarding the effects of medical
licensing board characteristics on rates of physician discipline. 142 Lacking,
however, appear to be serious, well-controlled longitudinal studies of the
marginal benefits, in terms of quality of care, of varying entry standards.
The states may offer a sort of "laboratory" for testing different regulatory
responses to complex problems but testing the consumer benefits of, for
example, longer residency requirements, appears not to have been done. 143
138. See generally Paul B. Ginsburg & Ernest Moy, Physician Licensure and the Quality of
Care: The Role of New Information Technologies, 15 REGULATION 32 (1992) (discussing the
effects of licensure on the quality of physician services, and state board mechanisms to respond to
decreased quality of services).
139. See Kugler & Sauer, supra note 3, at 463 (reporting income effects from physician re-
licensing in Israel); Leffler, supra note 3, at 185-86 (finding cartel rents, but small ones in
equilibrium periods). Studies have found positive effects in other licensed health professions. See,
e.g., Cox & FOSTER, supra note 37, at 31 (providing a table indicating the effects of certain
restrictions on dentistry, optometry, and pharmacy prices); Morris M. Kleiner & Robert T. Kudrle,
Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry, 43 J.L. & ECON. 547, 575-
76 (2000) (finding that tougher dental regulation resulted in increased dental prices and higher
hourly earnings for dentists, but had no apparent effect on malpractice premiums or on the number
of patient complaints).
140. See A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 28 & n. 202 (citing studies on the
effect of licensing requirements on health care provider mobility between states).
141. A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 1, ch. 2, at 27; L. Gregory Pawlson & Margaret E.
O'Kane, Professionalism, Regulation, and the Market: Impact on Accountability for Quality of
Care, 21 HEALTH AFF. 200, 204 (2002) ("Traditional regulation has been erratic in its scope and
has created limited evidence to suggest its effectiveness in fostering quality."). See also Kugler &
Sauer, supra note 3, at 463 (stating that stricter licensure requirements lead to a lower average
quality of service); Chris Paul, Physician Licensure Legislation and the Quality of Medical Care,
12 ATL. ECON. J. 18, 24-26 (1984) (finding some evidence that the overall impact of physician
licensure on the quality of care is neutral).
142. Marc T. Law & Zeynep K. Hansen, Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and
Physician Discipline: An Empirical Analysis, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 63, 90 (2010)
(reporting greater resources and board independence associated with greater frequency of
disciplinary action).
143. One study of an allied health care profession-dentistry-found that more stringent entry
requirements were associated with lower rates of dental neglect, but also noted that neither the full
benefits nor costs of those licensing requirements were observed, and hence did not reach
conclusions about their net impact on consumer welfare. ARLENE HOLEN, PUB. RESEARCH INST.,
CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, THE ECONOMICS OF DENTAL LICENSURE vii, 23, 26 (1978),
available at http://www.cna.org/documents/0203440000.PDF. The implications of that study for
evaluating differences in current entry standards for physicians is simply unclear. Interestingly,
there is at least some evidence that patient care by second year medical residents is not superior to
that provided by first year medical residents. Lisa. L. Willett et al., Differences in Preventive
Health Quality by Residency Year: Is Seniority Better?, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 825, 829
(2005)
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Moreover, differences in substantive entry requirements do not appear
to be rationalized by, for example, varying state assessments of the trade-off
between the benefits of enhanced safety assurances and the costs of
additional restrictions on physician entry.144 Requiring three years of post-
graduate residence training as opposed to two, for instance, could be an
effort to guarantee a higher minimum standard of physician care, despite
potential costs such as reduced access, increased prices, or negative
selection.145 States could have different aggregate preferences regarding
such trade-offs and different entry requirements could reflect such
preferences. That case for variation seems not to have been made, however,
and there does not appear to be an empirical basis on which to make it.
Numerous studies of training programs seem too particular to serve this
end;146 some point to other problems.147 Converging entry standards make
the argument independently dubious; and special restrictions on
telemedicine practice seem entirely distinct from such concerns, as do, for
example, varying licensing fees.
To some extent, difficulties in evaluating the total and relative costs
and benefits of state licensing systems are bound up with one of the main
justifications for licensure in the first place: thick, rigorous, and non-
controversial quality metrics are hard to obtain in many areas of health
care. 148 Perhaps therefore it's not surprising that the relative excellence or
144. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan et al., The Role of Physician Specialty Board Certification
Status in the Quality Movement, 292 JAMA 1038, 1040-41 (2004) (discussing three bodies of
evidence for medical certification as a measure of physician quality: the validity of the testing
process, the relationship between examination scores and physician competence, and the
relationship between certification and clinical outcomes).
145. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
146. See, e .g., Charles H. Griffith, Ill et al., Internal Medicine Residency Training and
Outcomes, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 390, 390 (1997) (noting that the objective of the study was
to discuss the impact of internal medicine residents' clinical education on patient outcomes; the
study did not discuss the costs of additional years of residency training); Jeanette Mladenovic et
al., Variation in Internal Medicine Residency Clinic Practices: Assessing Practice Environments
and Quality of Care, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 914, 914-15 (2008) (noting that the objectives of
the study were to describe the patient population cared for by trainees, assess the quality of
preventative care given to the patient population, describe the existing practice-based systems in
internal medicine residency clinics, and examine the relationships between practice-based systems
and the features of a program).
147. See, e.g., Willett et al., supra note 143, at 827-28 (finding that extended postgraduate and
resident requirements do not always produce improved quality of care).
148. See supra notes 84-86, and accompanying text (regarding the transparency of health care
quality information). Without disputing progress in the interim, we note that the problem was put
starkly in a 1998 article in the Milbank Quarterly: "there is little systematic evidence about quality
of care in the United States. We have no mandatory national system and few local systems to track
the quality of care delivered to the American people." Mark A. Schuster et al., How Good is the
Quality of Health Care in the United States?, 76 MILBANK Q. 517, 517 (1998). The Dartmouth
Atlas, which has done much to assess health care performance and spending, reported a need for
better evidence and better quality measures in 2009. ELLIOTT FISHER ET AL., DARTMOUTH
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efficiency of different state regulations is not well understood. 149 Further
complications should be noted. For example, increased terms of mandatory
residence for medical graduates - which may not be associated with
improved quality of care in any case1 50 - may suppress the supply of
primary care givers in several ways. It may reduce the overall supply of
practitioners if new physicians opt for alternative and less costly regulatory
settings, or it may bias new practitioners toward specialty practice,
suppressing the relative number of primary care physicians.151 Restrictions
on physician entry also may have mixed effects to the extent that marginal
patients opt for alternative care givers, such as AHPs, or opt out of
treatment altogether.1 52 That, in turn, raises questions about the twin effects
of limits on physician entry and limits on the scope of practice of alternative
professionals. 153
Yet another complication is presented by the fact that the costs of
state-by-state variation in regulation may be especially high in network
ATLAS, DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POL'Y & CLINICAL PRAC., HEALTH CARE SPENDING,
QUALITY, AND OUTCOMES: MORE ISN'T ALWAYS BETTER 4-5 (2009), available at
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Spending Brief_022709.pdf.
149. "The main difficulty in measuring quality effects is in obtaining accurate measures of
practitioner quality." Kugler & Sauer, supra note 3, at 438.
150. See Willett et al., supra note 143, at 828 (failing to find qualitative benefits to second-year
resident treatment relative to treatment provided by first-year residents).
151. Cf FISHER ET AL., supra note 148, at 2 (describing the "paradox of plenty" where
increased specialist supply is not associated with improved access).
152. See id. at 2 (discussing research that has indicated that patients in geographic regions with
fewer medical resources and lower Medicaid spending see physicians less frequently and receive
fewer diagnostic tests). See generally Keith J. Mueller et al., Health Status and Access to Care
Among Rural Minorities, 10 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 230, 231 (1999)
(explaining that rural minority patients have limited access to physicians due to socioeconomic
hardship and a "dearth of health care providers").
153. General questions about the scope of practice restrictions on alternative professionals and
access to basic health care have been raised by FTC staff regarding the regulation of limited
service clinics. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm'n to Jill Brown, supra note 88, at 1-2
(suggesting that proposed regulations on the scope of practice within limited service clinics are
not needed because studies indicate that the quality of care in such clinics is just as good as in
other clinic settings). However, substitution does not necessarily lower quality care; there is
evidence suggesting that the quality of alternative professional care, within the scope of practice,
is not lower. See Dulisse & Cromwell, supra note 118, at 1472-74 (finding no evidence of
additional harm in states where nurse anesthetists may provide anesthesiology services without
physician supervision versus those where they may not); Ateev Mehrotra et al., Comparing Costs
and Quality of Care at Retail Clinics With That of Other Medical Settings for 3 Common Illnesses,
151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 321, 325-26 & tbl.3(2009) (analyzing fourteen quality metrics for
commonly treated ailments otitis media [ear infection], streptococcal pharyngitis [strep throat],
and urinary tract infections, and finding little evidence to support concern about greater rates of
misdiagnosis at retail clinics).
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industries. 154 There may be significant positive externalities to consumption
in certain industries (goods or services); in particular, "[t]here are many
products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the
good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good."i 55
Hence, for example, the benefit a consumer may derive from the purchase
of a telephone depends on the number of others using the same telephone
network, among other things.156 HIT and telemedicine exhibit many
characteristics of network industries. 157 Further, there is empirical evidence
that HIT is subject to network effects. 15 8 Specifically, Miller and Tucker
have observed local network effects in HIT adoption, finding a robust and
positive relationship between the installed base of hospital HIT in a given
local health service area and the likelihood of adoption by additional
hospitals. 159 That is, the more hospital HIT there is in a service area, the
more likely it is that neighboring hospitals will adopt HIT.160 These
network effects, however, are contingent on the extent of privacy regulation
in a given state; in fact, they are observed to disappear entirely in states that
apply certain consent requirements to hospitals.161 In addition, because they
tend to suppress the local network benefits associated with hospital EHR
adoption, these state laws are associated with lower rates - up to 25 percent
154. See, e.g., FTC INNOVATIONS TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 231 (statement of Amalia
Miller, Professor, Dep't of Econ., Univ. of Va.) (estimating the network effect in states without
strong privacy laws to be about 6%).
155. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,
75 AM. ECON. REV. 424,424 (1985).
156. Id.
157. As described below, one panelist at the FTC Workshop described research suggesting that
there were significant network benefits in eMR adoption by hospitals, at least in states where
those effects were not suppressed by countervailing state regulation. FTC INNOVATIONS
TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 231 (statement of Amalia Miller, Professor, Dep't of Econ., Univ.
of Va.) (finding evidence of network effects in hospitals responsive to other hospitals and
estimating the network effect in states without strong state privacy laws, in addition to federal
laws, to be about 6%).
158. Id. at 230-31.
159. Id. at 231.
160. Id. This effect is observed across states that have not adopted certain privacy regulations,
pertaining to hospital sharing of health information, above the federal floor established by HIPAA,
the federal privacy rule, and other federal laws. See supra text accompanying note 162. However,
this positive network effect essentially disappears in states that have adopted hospital health
privacy laws above the federal floor. FTC INNOVATIONS TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 231
(statement of Amalia Miller, Professor, Dep't of Econ., Univ. of Va.)
161. FTC INNOVATIONS TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 231 (statement of Amalia Miller,
Professor, Dep't of Econ., Univ. of Va.) Most of the data came prior to HHS's adoption of the
Privacy Rule, so absent state law, there were no privacy laws applied to hospitals. See id. at 230
(noting that the data used to study the network effects of HIT adoption were collected in 2002,
1999, and 1996); see also Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,462-463 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (providing
final rule that outlines standards to protect individuals' identifiable health information).
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lower - of HIT adoption.162 The data also suggest that hospitals adopting
systems in states with more stringent privacy protections are more likely to
adopt proprietary, closed systems than open or interoperable ones.163
We do not have a comparable empirical analysis of licensure's impact
on network effects in HIT. Numerous stakeholders have identified state
licensure requirements as a regulatory barrier that may slow HIT
implementation.164 As noted above, licensure restrictions restrict the scope
of telemedicine practices or other HIT-aided collaboration across state
lines. 16 5 Hence, any given provider - as an HIT consumer - might
anticipate fewer benefits to HIT adoption and interoperability than the
provider would in the absence of such restrictions. Correspondingly,
positive consumption externalities for consumers in other states may be
reduced even if a provider implements interoperable HIT. Hence, there are
ample reasons to be concerned about licensure's impact on network effects
(and benefits) in telemedicine, although there is no adequate measure of the
actual impact.
IV. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing sections identify questions for further research - to be
sure - and perhaps constitute a brief for ongoing antitrust scrutiny of state
licensing practices. More than that, there are grounds to be concerned about
the competitive costs of state-based licensing, both generally, and in its
particular implications for telemedicine. The costs seem to be substantial, if
162. FTC INNOVATIONS TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 231; Amalia R. Miller & Catherine E.
Tucker, Privacy Protection and Technology Diffusion: The Case of Electronic Medical Records,
55 MGMT. SCI. 1077, 1077 (2009).
163. FTC INNOVATIONS TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 232 (statement of Amalia Miller,
Professor, Dep't of Econ., Univ. of Va.).
164. Several participants at the FTC's Innovations in Health Care Delivery workshop
identified this as an ongoing issue for HIT development and adoption. See FTC INNOVATIONS
TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 176 (statement of Dr. Douglas Wood, Vice Chair, Dep't of Internal
Med., Mayo Clinic)(flagging licensing issues as a less talked about concern relating to HIT
development); FTC INNOVATIONS TRANSCRIPT, supra note 33, at 267 (statement of Dr. Robert M.
Kolodner, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.)
(noting the need to harmonize standards if the use and implementation of HIT is going to move
forward). General concern about the problem is longstanding. See generally TELEMEDICINE
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9 (identifying licensing as an impediment to telemedicine in
1997).
165. TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9. For a more recent discussion
relating to state-based licensure issues and telemedicine, see also Lindsey T. Goehring, H.R. 2068:
Expansion of Quality or Quantity in Telemedicine in the Rural Trenches ofAmerica?, 11 N.C. J.L.
& TECH. ON. 99, 107-09 (2009), available at http://jolt.unc.edulsites/default/files/Goehring.pdf
(arguing for more inter-state cooperation on the issue of physician licensing for purposes of
telemedicine growth).
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not fully assessed. 166 As noted above, more than a few states have adopted
licensing regulations to restrict interstate telemedicine practice in
particular.' 67 To the extent that the barriers to entry posed by state licensure
require justification - a demonstration of countervailing consumer
protection benefits - the justification appears to be lacking. As entry
requirements converge, there is reason to suspect that remaining differences
are unlikely to be associated with large, demonstrable consumer benefits. 168
Ongoing harmonization efforts may be promising, 169  but
harmonization is a costly process,170 and cannot eliminate the costs of
regulatory variation itself. Without some form of reciprocity or mutual
recognition, even perfect harmonization of substantive licensing
requirements would leave many of the barriers to interstate telemedicine
intact. Adjoining states could require not just the same USMLE tests for
entry, but could also require the same tests taken on the same terms (the
same time period, the same number of possible re-takes, etc.), the same
residency periods, the same licensing fees, etc. If, however, states were to
leave in place (a) a requirement of local (state) licensure, (b) identification
of interstate telemedicine consultation with the practice of medicine at both
ends of communication, and (c) limited or null reciprocity with regards to
each other's licensing, they would continue to impede telemedicine.
The possibility of wholesale federal preemption of state licensing -
discussed at the roundtable and elsewherel 71 - seems problematic and may
be preliminary at best. In some ways, concerns about state licensing
represent both a best case and a worst case for federal preemption of state
law. There are reasons to consider preemption. First, the mix of licensing
regimes appears to be costly and a non-trivial impediment to major federal
166. See Goehring, supra note 165, at 107 (discussing the impracticality of obtaining multiple
state medical licenses and the resulting obstacle it creates to the efficient use of telemedicine).
Some have argued that the inability of physicians to "see" patients via phone calls or emails has
resulted in an incredibly costly and inefficient system of health care delivery. See, e.g., FISHER ET
AL., supra note 148, at 5 (suggesting that physicians regularly see patients for whom care could be
provided via telephone or email in-office because these doctors "need to keep their offices full to
pay the rent").
167. See supra notes 14, 118 and accompanying text.
168. See Cox & FOSTER, supra note 21, at 21-36 (stating that restrictions on education or
experience may not result in increases in output quality of services).
169. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (regarding uniform administration of USMLE
tests and efforts to streamline and harmonize licensing and make licensure more portable).
170. Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1319-20, 1362, 1365, 1370-71 (2000) (regarding the
difficulties and harms of harmonizing privacy rules across national borders).
171. Live policy discussion of the possibility of preemption has been ongoing for well over a
decade, garnering consideration in, for example, the Telemedicine Report to Congress submitted
by Commerce and HHS in 1997. See generally TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note
9.
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policy initiatives and important private innovations in health care
delivery. 172 Also, it is not at all clear that the varied practices of the
independent professional boards of medicine - to which so much licensing
authority is delegated - serve any particular values of federalism directly.
At the same time, licensing is an area traditionally ceded to the
states. 173 That is likely a political problem more than a constitutional one.
Federal authority to regulate health care is not unbounded, but the extension
or application of commerce clause authority into diverse areas of health and
safety regulation has been frequent and largely sustained, at least since the
New Deal. 174 Recognizing potential complications with any putative
preemption argument, it should not be supposed that the authority for
federal regulation in this area depends critically on the question whether
federal requirements are conditioned on federal grants or funding. As noted
in the 1997 Telemedicine Report to Congress, there appears to be adequate
legal authority for the federal government to establish uniform physician
licensing and preempt state licensing regimes.175
Preemption would, however, pose an institutional problem. In brief,
there is no federal regulatory competitor standing ready at hand. There are,
of course, federal regulations pertaining to physician qualifications and
conduct. 176 And considerable expertise pertinent to standards of care
resides at H{HS and elsewhere. 177 Still, there is no federal agency with the
172. Id. See also 2001 TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 136 at 21-26 (noting
that, since the 1997 report, inter-state licensing requirements have become an even more concrete
barrier to the expansion of telemedicine and discussing potential solutions).
173. TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9. Each state has a Medical Practice
Act that "defines the process and procedures for granting a health professional license, renewing a
license, and regulating medical practice within the state." Id.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432, 434 (1947) (explaining that the 1938
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act "rests upon the constitutional power resident in Congress
to regulate interstate commerce . . . [and] seeks to keep interstate channels free from deleterious,
adulterated and misbranded articles of the specified types."). See also TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 9 (providing a general discussion of the legal issues with regard to
licensure).
175. See TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9 (recognizing the states' "clear
authority" to design medical licensing schemes but noting the federal government's authority to
do the same per the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution).
176. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (2006) (prohibiting the solicitation or receipt of
patient care related kickbacks); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, §§ 261-264, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021-34 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C) (outlining the privacy standards with which physicians must comply).
177. See generally RANDALL R. BOVBJERG ET AL., STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS:
ASSESSING STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES v-xi (2006), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/stdiscp.htm (summarizing a report commissioned by HHS
to assess physician standards of care as demonstrated through state medical board disciplinary
proceedings).
1152011]1
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
authority, experience, and expertise to perform the various licensing
functions undertaken by the states and it would not be trivial to create one.
Mutual recognition - or some form of federally mandated reciprocity -
may be the most promising alternative. Either alternative could leave in
place state authority to oversee medical practice and to discipline
substandard care. These options would require some groundwork, to be
sure. Among other things, additional evidence on the costs and benefits of
various licensure systems is pertinent not just to the question whether to
maintain multiple licensing authorities but to forging some consensus on
best and worst standards. Nonetheless, as noted above, substantive entry
requirements for physicians have been converging for some time, 178 and
many states have undertaken both to harmonize licensure and to make it
more portable.179 Moreover, mutual recognition or reciprocity could leave
in place state disciplinary authority, making use of extant institutional
resources in the states and, at least arguably, making the best use of the
relative advantage of local and state authorities to judge aspects of care that,
for economic or social reasons, remain justifiably varied. State regulators
could continue to administer disciplinary codes just as state courts continue
to adjudicate tort claims in interstate commerce.
Mutual recognition or reciprocity also needs to acknowledge one of
the motivating factors for enhanced licensing requirements for telemedicine
consultation (however unfortunate the results, and however much regulators
have jumped ahead of demonstrated need). That is, the distinction between
mere consultation and the practice of medicine should be eroded by further
development and adoption of HIT and telemedicine, which are, after all,
about the integration of care and health care resources. Provisions that
would permit certain limited interstate telemedicine consultations - whether
under uniform federal law or the laws of several states - may provide very
limited and temporary safe harbors for telemedicine practice. 8 0 Extant
models of such provisions do not reach much of what is contemplated by
existing technology and federal health policy already, and may have less to
do still with future developments.
178. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. Cf, e.g., NURSE LICENSURE COMPACT
ADM'RS, NURSE LICENSING COMPACT (NLC): FACT SHEET FOR LICENSEES AND NURSING
STUDENTS (2010), available at
https://www.ncsbn.org/2010_NLCA-factsheet studentsJuly_2010.pdf (detailing the NLC, which
provides nurses with one multi-state license to allow for inter-state practice).
180. See, e.g., FED'N STATE MED. BDS., A MODEL ACT TO REGULATE THE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE ACROSS STATE LINES (1996), available at
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/1 996_grpolTelemedicine.pdf (providing generic guidelines for states to
use when adopting broader licensing schemes that would promote the use of telemedicine).
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These are difficult issues but not fundamentally intractable. As the
nation forges ahead toward the "meaningful use" of HIT, 181 it is incumbent
on policy makers to resolve them.
181. See, e.g., Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,314 (July
28, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 422, and 495) (implementing regulations
establishing the definition of "meaningful use of certified electronic health record (EHR)
technology" and establishing the way in which health information technology will be used by
physicians and hospitals in the coming years).
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